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Quantum Theory: a Pragmatist Approach 
 
While its applications have made quantum theory arguably the most successful theory in physics, 
its interpretation continues to be the subject of lively debate within the community of physicists 
and philosophers concerned with conceptual foundations. This situation poses a problem for a 
pragmatist for whom meaning derives from use. While disputes about how to use quantum 
theory have arisen from time to time, they have typically been quickly resolved, and consensus 
reached, within the relevant scientific sub-community. Yet rival accounts of the meaning of 
quantum theory continue to proliferate1. In this article I offer a diagnosis of this situation and 
outline a pragmatist solution to the problem it poses, leaving further details for subsequent 
articles. 
 
1. Introduction. What is it to interpret quantum theory? Addressing this question, van Fraassen 
(1991) characterized the interpretative task as an attempt to say: “What is really going on, 
according to this theory?’ and “How could the world possibly be how this theory says it is?” This 
ties interpretation directly to representation: it assumes that the theory offers representations 
and/or descriptions of the physical world. In (Healey 1989, 6) I expressed sympathy for such a 
tie as follows: “I should like to add...that a satisfactory interpretation of quantum mechanics 
should make it clear what the world would be like if quantum mechanics were true.” But I 
continued by noting that it would be inappropriate to criticize a proposed interpretation solely on 
the grounds that it does not meet this constraint. A theory may further the goals of physics 
without itself offering novel representations or descriptions of physical reality. If quantum theory 
is such a theory, then we need an account of how and why it is able to achieve its enormous 
success. To provide such an account is to offer an interpretation of quantum theory. That is what 
I set out to do here. 
 The claim that quantum theory does not itself offer novel depictions of reality may strike 
some readers as obviously false. What could be more novel than representing the state of a 
system by a mathematical object such as a wave-function, state vector or density operator, 
especially when this may represent it as in a superposition, or as entangled with other systems? 
This is surely quantum theory’s distinctive way of describing physical systems, whether or not 
the description is complete. But there has long been a rival view according to which quantum 
states convey knowledge or information concerning a system or ensemble without describing its 
physical condition. I shall elaborate a version of this view that assigns a two-fold role to the 
quantum state. It plays its primary role in the algorithm provided by the Born Rule for generating 
quantum probabilities. The quantum state’s secondary role cannot be so simply described, but 
here is the general idea. Any application of quantum theory involves claims describing a physical 
situation2. For example, in an application of the theory to predict or explain results of a 
contemporary two-slit interference experiment involving detection of individual particles, some 
                                                 
1 In addition to multiple variants of the Copenhagen interpretation, we now have 
Everettian interpretations of several kinds (many worlds, many minds, ...), the existential 
interpretation, the transactional interpretation, decoherent histories interpretations, relational 
interpretations, modal interpretations, de Broglie-Bohm interpretations, quantum Bayesian 
interpretations, etc. 
2 This may be a situation of a certain type, or a token of that type.   
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claims will describe the apparatus, while others will describe the results of the experiment. But 
while claims concerning where individual particles are detected contributing to the interference 
pattern are considered permissible (and even essential), claims about which slit each particle 
went through are typically alleged to be “meaningless”3. The secondary role of the quantum state 
is to offer guidance on the legitimacy and limitations of descriptive claims about a physical 
situation. The key idea here is that even assuming unitary evolution of the quantum state of 
system and environment, delocalization of system state coherence into the environment will 
typically (though not always) render descriptive claims about experimental results and the 
condition of apparatus and other macroscopic objects beyond  reproach. 
  I call this interpretation pragmatist for several reasons. First it takes the uses and 
applications of the theory to have explanatory priority over its representational capacities. In his 
trenchant critique of contemporary formulations of quantum mechanics, Bell (1987, 125) 
unfavorably compared the theory so formulated to classical mechanics: “Of course, it is true that 
also in classical mechanics any isolation of a system from the world as a whole involves 
approximation. But at least one can envisage an accurate theory, of the universe, to which the 
restricted account is an approximation.” I doubt that one can envisage a detailed and accurate 
representation of the universe within classical mechanics. Obtaining and using a complete and 
accurate mathematical model of the universe within classical mechanics would vastly exceed the 
combined observational and cognitive capacities of humanity or any other physically realizable 
community of agents, while only in use would such a mathematical model represent anything. 
But it does not constitute a criticism of a formulation of quantum theory that within it one cannot 
envisage a complete and accurate representation of the universe, since no successful use or 
application of quantum theory to cosmology or anywhere else requires that one be able to do so. 
 The second pragmatist motif concerns the interpretation of quantum probabilities, which 
are taken to be neither subjective nor straightforwardly objective, but function as a source of 
authoritative advice to an agent on what to expect and so how to act in specific physical 
situations. Probabilities derived from the Born Rule do not describe statistical frequencies, even  
in ideal infinite ensembles: nor do they describe objective chances of individual events. But to 
accept quantum theory is to commit oneself to apportioning one’s partial beliefs in accordance 
with the probabilities generated by the Born Rule as applied to a quantum state appropriate to 
one’s physical circumstances. I begin to spell this out in more detail in section 2 below. 
 While not itself issuing descriptive claims about physical reality, quantum theory does 
advise an agent on the scope and limitations of descriptive claims it may make in a given 
situation.4 The advice does not consist in declaring some such claims simply meaningless and so 
impermissible while others are meaningful and legitimate. Instead the theory places limitations 
on the inferential power of claims pertaining to the physical situation in which the agent finds 
itself, or which it represents itself as occupying. Now it is characteristic of pragmatist approaches 
to meaning to take the content of a descriptive claim to derive ultimately from its inferential 
                                                 
3 Bohmians, of course, reject this allegation. But even they will admit that attempts to 
verify such claims are either incompatible with appearance of the unaltered interference pattern 
or themselves rest on equally unverifiable assumptions. 
4 With occasional exceptions for stylistic reasons, I refer to a generalized agent by the 
pronoun ‘it’ throughout as a way of emphasizing that users of quantum theory need be neither 
human nor even conscious, however unlikely the present prospect of nonhuman users. 
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relations to other claims and commitments rather than from how it corresponds to the reality it 
purports to represent.5 Accepting quantum theory means following its advice to limit the 
inferential power associated with descriptive claims that may be appropriate in a specific 
physical situation. So the theory modifies the content of those claims. 
 Bell (1987, 41) introduced the term ‘beable’ (in contrast to quantum theory’s 
‘observable’) to apply to things “which can be described in ‘classical terms’, because they are 
there. The beables must include the settings of switches and knobs on experimental equipment, 
the current in coils, and the readings of instruments.” (53) He emphasized that by ‘classical 
terms’ he (following Bohr) “refers simply to the familiar language of everyday affairs, including 
laboratory procedures, in which objective properties—beables—are assigned to objects.” (41)  
This at least suggests that a claim about current (for example) derives its content in part from the 
primitive semantic fact that ‘current’ refers to (the value of the) current, taken to be intelligible 
independently of one’s disposition to countenance (defeasible) inferences involving this claim 
(such as the inference that the current consists in the motion of tiny electrically charged particles 
through a metal, or that it has a source if the current is not zero). More importantly, it assumes 
that acceptance of quantum theory can in no way modify the content of a claim about beables. 
But a pragmatist may question that assumption. In section 3 I will offer an alternative account of 
judgments an agent using quantum theory may make about its physical situation that allows for 
modification of the content even of claims about its macroscopic environment, including the 
readings of instruments. 
 
2. The Objectivity of Quantum Probabilities. Any attempt to understand quantum theory must 
address the significance of probabilities derived from the Born Rule, which I write as follows 
probρ(AεΔ )=Tr( ρP A[Δ])            (Born Rule) 
where A is a dynamical variable (an “observable”) pertaining to a system s, ρ represents a 
quantum state of that system by a density operator on a Hilbert space Hs , Δ is a Borel set of real 
numbers (so AεΔ states that the value of A lies in Δ), and P A[Δ] is the value for Δ of the 
projection-valued measure defined by the unique self-adjoint operator on Hscorresponding 
to. Born probabilities yielded by systems’ quantum states are the key to successful 
applications of quantum theory to explain and predict natural phenomena involving them. If one 
denies that the quantum state describes or represents the physical properties or relations of any 
system or ensemble of systems, then its main job is simply to yield these probabilities. But what 
kind of probabilities are these, and what, exactly, are they probabilities of? 
 If one clear conclusion has been established by foundational work, it is that not every 
probability derivable by applying the Born rule to a system with quantum state ρ can be taken as 
a quantitative measure of ignorance or uncertainty of the real-numbered value of a dynamical 
variable on that system. Born probabilities are not analogous to probabilities in classical 
                                                 
5 Here is how Brandom (2000, 18) characterizes his pragmatist approach to the 
conceptual content of a descriptive judgment: 
Pragmatism about the conceptual seeks to understand what it is explicitly to say or think 
that something is the case in terms of what one must implicitly know how (be able) to do. 
That the relevant sort of doing is a constellation of asserting and inferring, making claims 
and giving and asking for reasons for them, is the essence of rationalist or inferentialist 
pragmatism about the conceptual. 
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statistical mechanics in that they cannot be jointly represented on any classical phase space: 
quantum observables are not random variables on a common probability space.6 However, as I 
expressed it the Born rule specifies, for any state ρ, a probability for each sentence of the form S: 
The value of A lies in Δ. The traditional way to resolve the resulting tension is to take each 
instantiation of the Born rule to observable A to be (perhaps implicitly) conditional on 
measurement of A, and to assume or postulate that only observables represented by commuting 
operators can be measured together.7 Whether this resolution is satisfactory has been the topic of 
a heated debate.8 I will address aspects of this in the next section, which offers an account of 
what the Born probabilities are probabilities of. But whatever they concern, what kind of 
probabilities are these? 
 It is common to classify an interpretation of probability as either objective or subjective. 
Accounts of probability in terms of frequency, propensity or single-case chance count as 
objective, while the personalist Bayesian interpretation counts as subjective. But then how 
should one classify classical (Laplacean), logical and “objective” Bayesian notions of 
probability? It will be best to leave the tricky issue of objectivity aside for a while, so I begin 
instead by classifying accounts of probability on the basis of their answers to the question “Does 
a probability judgment function as a description of anything in the natural world?” von 
Mises’s(1922; 2003, 194) answer to this question was clear: 
Probability calculus is part of theoretical physics in the same way as classical mechanics 
or optics, it is an entirely self-contained theory of certain phenomena . . . 
So was Popper’s(1967, 32-3) 
In proposing the propensity interpretation I propose to look upon probability statements 
as statements about some measure of a property (a physical property, comparable to 
symmetry or asymmetry) of the whole experimental arrangement; a measure, more 
precisely, of a virtual frequency... 
These are expressions of what I will call a natural property account of probability. 
 Accounts of probability as a natural property typically take this to be a property of 
something in the physical world independent of the epistemic state of anyone making judgments 
about it. When de Finetti wrote in the preface to his (1974) “PROBABILITY DOES NOT 
EXIST”, this was what he meant to deny.  But he wrote elsewhere (1968, 48) that probability 
means degree of belief (as actually held by someone, on the ground of his whole 
knowledge, experience, information) regarding the truth of a sentence, or event E (a fully 
specified ‘single’ event or sentence, whose truth or falsity is, for whatever reason, 
unknown to the person). 
and it is at least plausible to suppose that an actual degree of belief is a natural property of the 
person holding it. If so, even the arch subjectivist de Finetti here adopts a natural property 
                                                 
6 Key results are due to Gleason(1957), Bell(1965), Kochen and Specker(1966). The 
literature now contains many extensions and simplifications, such as Mermin(1990).  
7 An alternative is to privilege a single observable (or commuting family) and take the 
Born rule as a measure of uncertainty only of the values of privileged observables. Applications 
of the Born rule to underprivileged observables (conditional on measurement) must then be 
justified by saying how they are indirectly measured by directly measuring a privileged 
observable. 
8 See especially Bell(1990), Peierls(1991), Mermin(2006). 
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account of probability! Of course, he would insist that different persons may, and often do, hold 
different beliefs, which makes probability personalist—varying from person to person—and to 
that extent subjective. 
 On other “subjectivist” views, an agent’s degrees of belief count as probabilities only in 
so far as its overall epistemic state meets a normative constraint of coherence,9 since otherwise 
these partial beliefs will not satisfy Kolmogorov’s(1933) axioms defining probability 
mathematically as a finitely additive, unit-normed, non-negative function on a field of sets. 
Ramsey(1926), for one, took probability theory as a branch of logic, the logic of partial belief 
and inconclusive argument.10 So viewed, probability theory offers an agent prescriptions for 
adjusting the corpus of its beliefs so that its total epistemic state meets minimal internal 
standards of rationality—standards that are nevertheless met by the total epistemic state of few if 
any actual agents. A probability judgment made by an agent then counts as an expression of its 
partial degree of belief and a commitment to hold its epistemic state to this minimal standard of 
rationality. Such a probability judgment does not function as a description of the agent’s own 
belief state, and is certainly not a description of a natural property of anything else in the 
physical world. 
 On the present approach, quantum probabilities given by the Born rule do not describe 
any natural property of the system or systems to which they pertain, or of any other physical 
system or situation: nor is it their function to describe any actual agent’s state of belief, 
knowledge or information. Their function is to offer advice to any actual or hypothetical agent on 
the extent of its commitment to claims expressible by sentences of the form S: The value of A on 
s lies in Δ—roughly, what degree of belief or credence to attach to such a claim. 
 Consider as an example the experiment of Tonomura et al.(1989) in which the positions 
of electrons are detected in an electron-biprism version of the two-slit experiment by the discrete, 
localized flashes they produce on a sensitive screen as each makes its contribution to the classic 
interference pattern. Before running the experiment, an experimenter does not know whether the 
following statement S34 is true: The position of the 34th electron to contribute to the interference 
pattern is on the left hand side of the screen. Afterwards he or she can check its truth-value by 
watching the video that recorded each individual flash as it occurred. Assuming the experiment 
has been correctly set up so that the whole apparatus up to and including the screen has exact 
left-right symmetry, the Born probability of S34 will be ½. Beforehand, an experimenter who 
makes this assumption and accepts quantum theory should therefore believe S34 to the same 
degree that she disbelieves it. This partial belief will dispose the experimenter to behave in ways 
she would not have behaved if she had taken the Born probability of S34 to be .99: she may 
accept a bet on S34 she would have declined, or she may simply decide it is not necessary to 
readjust the apparatus to get a more symmetric interference pattern. 
 This is how quantum probabilities serve as what Bishop Butler famously called the very 
guide of life. It is quantum theory’s great achievement to have made available such a 
                                                 
9 Dutch book arguments seek to justify coherence constraints by appeal to rationality 
conditions on betting behavior. Representation theorems justify them by appeal to rationality 
conditions on preferences. In each case, these conditions are grounded on internalist norms rather 
than on external states of affairs in the natural world relevant to the content of the beliefs. 
10 But note that Ramsey himself there warned against taking his conclusions to prejudge 
the meaning of probability in physics. 
  
6
wonderfully reliable guide of such extraordinarily wide applicability. But note that to be guided 
by quantum theory in this way one needs to know more than just the Born rule—one needs to 
know what system or type of system to apply it to, and what quantum state to assign to that 
system. This kind of “know how” is a prerequisite for the successful application of any physical 
theory, classical as well as quantum. The success of quantum theory is due in large part to the 
hard-won acquisition of this kind of knowledge by physicists, which has often required great 
originality and ingenuity. Once acquired, much of it can be conveyed to others and taught to 
students, although applying Born probabilities to novel situations remains a skill that cannot be 
mastered by rote learning. But the important point is that knowing what quantum state to assign 
to a system in order to apply the Born rule constitutes objective knowledge, tacit or otherwise.11 
 While there are disputes about what quantum state to assign in a particular situation, 
these are typically resolved by the same kind of debates within the relevant scientific community 
as those surrounding the establishment of a novel biochemical structure. Exceptions to this 
generalization will be discussed in section 4. They are important because they illustrate respects 
in which quantum states, unlike classical states, are relational. But not everything that is 
relational is subjective, as debtors and widows are only too aware. What quantum state to ascribe 
to a system is not at the whim of each agent’s subjective beliefs, and nor are the Born 
probabilities consequent on this ascription. There are at least three reasons why these 
probabilities are objective. 
(1) There is widely shared agreement on them within the scientific community 
(2) A norm is operative within that community requiring resolution of any residual 
disagreements 
(3) This norm is not arbitrary but derives directly from the scientific aims of prediction, control 
and explanation of natural phenomena. 
(Details of the derivation must here remain a matter for further investigation.)  
Each of these is a reason both for why the Born rule is an essential part of the objective content 
of quantum theory and for why quantum state ascriptions and the consequent Born probabilities 
are themselves objective. 
  After formulating a minimalist account of truth, Wright(1992) presents considerations 
that may incline one to deploy a richer notion of truth as correspondence to objective reality in 
some domain. By applying these considerations to ascriptions of quantum probabilities we can 
further articulate the sense in which these are objective even though they do not describe any 
natural property of or associated with quantum systems. 
   The first consideration stems from the Cognitive Command constraint, of which this is 
an abbreviated version of Wright’s first “extremely rough” formulation: 
A discourse exhibits Cognitive Command if and only if it is a priori that differences of 
opinion arising within it can be satisfactorily explained only in terms of “divergent 
input”, “unsuitable conditions”, or “malfunction”. (92-3) 
He gives this later formulation to qualify and simplify his first formulation: 
It is a priori that differences of opinion formulated within the discourse, unless excusable 
as a result of vagueness in a disputed statement, or in the standards of acceptability, or 
variation in personal evidence thresholds, so to speak, will involve something which may 
properly be regarded as a cognitive shortcoming. (144) 
                                                 
11 See Polanyi(1962). 
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What is the idea of the Cognitive Command constraint, and what motivates it? Here is what 
Wright says: 
The formulation offered is an attempt to crystallise a very basic idea we have about 
objectivity: that, where we deal in a purely cognitive way with objective matters, the 
opinions which we form are in no sense optional or variable as a function of permissible 
idiosyncracy, but are commanded of us—that there will be a robust sense in which a 
particular point of view ought to be held, and a failure to hold a particular point of view 
can be understood only as a rational/cognitive failure. (146) 
This nicely captures the sense in which I claim quantum probabilities are objective. Indeed, one 
can locate a twofold source of the command in this case. Quantum theory itself commands that 
quantum probabilities conform to the Born rule: the community’s collective evidence-based 
judgment commands use of a particular quantum state in the Born rule. Neither command is 
arbitrary: the authority in each case rests ultimately on experimental and observational results  
and collective judgment of their evidential bearing. But Wright continues 
It is tempting to say that this just is, primitively, what is involved in thinking of a subject 
matter as purely objective, and of our mode of interaction with it as purely cognitive; and 
that the Cognitive Command constraint, as formulated, is merely what results when the 
basic idea is qualified to accommodate various germane kinds of vagueness. ... But...the 
truth is that the constraint does not reflect a wholly primitive characteristic of the notions 
of objectivity and cognitive engagement but derives its appeal, at least in part, from a 
truism to do with the idea of representation. For to think of oneself as functioning in 
purely cognitive mode, as it were, is, when the products of that function are beliefs, to 
think of oneself as functioning in representational mode...(ibid.) 
Reflection on the epistemic function of probability ascriptions should prompt one to question this 
“truism”. For while one is clearly functioning in cognitive mode when assessing probabilities, 
the products of that function are partial beliefs, and while each of these does indeed have some 
kind of representational content, only in the case of derivative, higher-order applications does 
this concern probabilities—in the fundamental situation, the content of each partial belief 
represents a possible state of the world free of any natural “probability properties”.12 The 
constitutive function of quantum probability statements is not to represent certain probabilistic 
aspects of the physical world, but to guide agents in forming appropriate partial beliefs about 
non-probabilistic aspects of the physical world. The intuition Wright takes his Cognitive 
Command constraint to express survives undercutting of any possible justification by appeal to 
alleged truisms about representation. 
 Wright introduces a second consideration favoring deployment of a richer notion of truth 
as correspondence to objective reality in some domain. 
Let the width of cosmological role of the subject matter of a discourse be measured by the 
extent to which citing the kinds of states of affairs with which it deals is potentially 
contributive to the explanation of things other than, or other than via, our being in 
attitudinal states which take such states of affairs as object... . The crucial question is... 
what else there is, other than our beliefs, of which the citation of such states of affairs can 
                                                 
12 While each partial belief formed in accordance with the Born probability rule does 
concern the physical world, the next section explains why it is best not to think of this in 
straightforwardly representational terms. 
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feature in.. explanations. (196-7) 
Ascriptions of quantum probability have very narrow cosmological role. While they may and do 
play a role in a huge variety of applications of quantum theory in prediction as well as 
explanation, in each case the contribution of quantum probabilities is indeed via an agent’s being 
in attitudinal states which take quantum probabilities as object. Someone may object that it is a 
basic role of quantum probabilities to explain frequencies observed, say, in experimental tests of 
Bell inequalities. But of course a claim about frequencies follows from a claim about 
probabilities only with a certain probability: so a judgment that an observed frequency is 
explained by a quantum probability itself proceeds via an agent’s being in attitudinal states 
which take quantum probabilities as object. 
 The narrow cosmological role of quantum probability statements provides further support 
for the conclusion that these do not represent natural properties. But it does nothing to undermine 
the objectivity of quantum probabilities. 
 Despite his avowed subjectivism about probability, David Lewis(1980) undertook to 
offer a subjectivist’s guide to a kind of objective probability he called chance. 
Along with subjective credence we should believe also in objective chance. The practice 
and the analysis of science require both concepts. Neither can replace the other. Among 
the propositions that deserve our credence we find, for instance, the proposition that (as a 
matter of contingent fact about our world) any tritium atom that now exists has a certain 
chance of decaying within a year. (1986, 83)  
I will explain in section 4 why quantum probabilities should not be taken to have all the features 
Lewis attributed to chance. But Lewis was right to believe that objective probabilities figure in 
science, and that these include quantum probabilities. This makes it particularly interesting that 
he took a single principle to capture all we know about chance, namely the Principal Principle, 
whose initial statement was as follows: 
Let C be any initially reasonable credence function. Let t be any time. Let x be any real 
number in the unit interval. Let X be the proposition that the chance, at time t, of A’s 
holding equals x. Let E be any proposition compatible with X that is admissible at time t. 
Then C(A/XE)=x. (1986, 87) 
If the only thing we know about objective probabilities is that they command an agent to adjust 
its credences (partial beliefs) so they equal the corresponding objective probabilities, then it is 
not surprising that they carry so little explanatory weight. The “thinness” of Lewis’s account of 
probability as it occurs within physics reinforces the application of Wright’s point—that 
narrowness of cosmological role is convincing evidence against a representational view of 
quantum probability as a natural property of (something in) the world. But this in no way 
undermines Lewis’s claim to be offering an account of objective probability. 
 
3. How quantum theory limits description of physical reality.  In their famous EPR(1935), 
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen assumed that quantum theory has descriptive resources but argued 
that these do not permit a complete description of physical reality. Specifically, their argument 
set out to show that the wave-function fails to give a complete description of the state of an 
individual system. But they took it for granted that the wave-function’s role was indeed to 
describe physical reality, however incompletely: Einstein(1949; 82-7, 682) suggested that the 
wave-function should be taken incompletely to describe a statistical ensemble of similarly 
prepared systems. 
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 On the pragmatist approach I am presenting here, the quantum state does not itself 
purport to describe physical reality at all—not even incompletely. But in addition to its role in 
generating quantum probabilities via the Born rule, it has an important secondary role in 
licensing limited claims about physical reality by an agent applying quantum theory. 
 One can appreciate the need for such a role only after one has abandoned the idea that 
quantum theory itself makes available new descriptive or representational resources, either in the 
form of quantum state ascriptions or in some other way (perhaps by allowing dynamical 
variables to take on operator-values—q-numbers—instead of, or as well as, real numbers—c-
numbers). Rather than thinking of quantum theory as providing distinctively new ways of 
describing or representing physical reality, focus instead on its effect on non-quantum 
descriptions and representations. 
 It is tempting to refer to such non-quantum descriptions and representations as classical, 
following Bohr and others. But there are at least two reasons not to yield to this temptation. First, 
it encourages the mistaken thought that any use of such a description carries with it the full 
content of classical physics, including dynamical laws such as those of Newton and Maxwell. 
More importantly, it tends unduly to limit the scope of non-quantum descriptions to exclude 
what Bell called “the familiar language of everyday affairs, including laboratory procedures” as 
well as descriptions made available by further advances in non-quantum physics (for example, 
possible modifications of classical relativity to secure empirical adequacy in light of new 
observations attributed to high-energy cosmic rays or so-called dark matter). The scope of non-
quantum descriptions is very wide: indeed, if quantum theory itself provides no resources for 
describing or representing physical reality, then all present and future ways of describing or 
representing it will be non-quantum. 
 It is critical for the present approach to have available non-quantum descriptions of 
outcomes of quantum measurements. Call a claim expressed by a sentence of the form S: “The 
value of A on s lies in Δ” a non-quantum magnitude claim (NQMC).  If one could not express the 
result of such a measurement in a NQMC, then the Born rule could acquire no empirical support 
from measurements and we should have little or no reason to believe quantum theory. Quantum 
theory itself does not imply sentences of the form S on the present approach, even in a case in 
which the Born rule assigns S probability 1. But physicists make claims using such sentences (or 
their equivalents) all the time, when describing the results of quantum measurements and in 
many other circumstances (e.g. in describing the operation of particle accelerators and nuclear 
reactors, as well as the position of ions in a crystal and the velocity and polarization of photons 
propagating through an optical fiber delay). How can one reconcile this practice with their 
acceptance of quantum theory, in light of the no-go results mentioned in section 2 (see footnote 
6)? 
 Answering this question will require excursions into pragmatist philosophy as well as the 
quantum physics of decoherence. Claims of environmentally-induced decoherence, to solve the 
quantum measurement problem and explain the emergence of classical behavior of macroscopic 
objects, are now widely (and wisely) regarded with suspicion.13 But it is hard to dismiss the 
thought that decoherence has some important role to play in resolving interpretational problems 
of quantum theory. As Bacciagaluppi(2003/7) and Schlosshauer(2007) explain, decoherence 
plays different roles within different attempted interpretations of the theory. So after a sketch of 
                                                 
13 See, for example, Bub(1997), Healey(1998), Adler(2003), Janssen(2008). 
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relevant quantum physics of decoherence, my main task here will be carefully to explain how a 
pragmatist can use this to explain when and how quantum theory itself can license the kind of 
non-quantum descriptive claims physicists do, and must, make in order successfully to apply 
quantum theory. 
 The basic idea of environmentally-induced delocalization of coherence is well known.14 
It may be illustrated by this toy model. Given an arbitrary superposed pure quantum state of a 
system s interacting with a system s′ in an appropriate initial quantum state |b0› , there are 
Hamiltonians on the tensor product Hilbert space Hs⊗Hs′  that will induce the following unitary 
evolution of the total quantum state of s+sʹ: 
   ∑i c i |ai›|b0› → ∑i ci |ai›|bi›  (2) 
for some complete orthonormal basis |ai› of Hs. The resulting quantum state of s is then given 
by partial tracing over Hs′  as ρs = ∑i |ci|2 |ai›‹ai|, which contains no terms diagonal in the 
preferred |ai› basis defined by the Hamiltonian for this interaction. Thinking of s′ as the 
environment of s, such an interaction with its environment has delocalized the coherence of s’s 
initial state into the more inclusive system s+s′ (which in this case remains pure): every Born 
probability for an observable on s alone equals the weighted average (with weights  |ci|2 ) of 
Born probabilities of all states |ai›. Following such an interaction, s will display none of the 
interference characteristic of quantum mechanical superpositions. To observe any interference it 
would be necessary to perform an appropriate joint measurement involving both of s and s′. 
 Environmentally induced decoherence has only relatively recently become the subject of 
experimental investigation. One particularly revealing set of experiments studies interference 
phenomena involving large molecules including fullerenes (C60 and C70 molecules). 
Hackermüller et al.(2004) investigated the effects of increased temperature in matter wave 
interferometer experiments in which C70 molecules lose their quantum behavior by thermal 
emission of radiation. They prepared a beam of C70 molecules of well-defined velocity, passed 
them through two gratings of a Talbot-Laue interferometer in a high vacuum, and detected those 
that passed through a third movable grating set at the appropriate Talbot distance and used as a 
scanning mask, by ionizing them and collecting the ions at a detector. Each molecule is 
sufficiently large and complex to be assigned a temperature as it stores a considerable amount of 
energy in its internal degrees of freedom. Interaction with the electromagnetic vacuum may 
result in emission of photons with an intensity and frequency that increases as the internal 
temperature is raised. These photons may be considered the environment of the molecule. 
Entanglement between such photon states and the state of the emitting molecule tends to induce 
environmental decoherence. 
 Hackermüller et al.(2004) present a theoretical model of this decoherence that fits their 
observations quite well, as the observed interference dies away when the molecules’ temperature 
is raised from 1000°K to 3000°K. This model bears an interesting correspondence to more 
informal discussions of how the possibility of observing through which slit a particle passed will 
prevent observation of any consequent interference pattern.15 Such discussions often focus on 
particular methods for trying to observe through which slit each particle passes, and proceed to 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Joos et al.(2003), Schlosshauer(2007), Zurek(2003, 2009). 
15 See, for example, Feynman(1963, vol. III, 1.8-9). 
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argue that quantum features of the required apparatus necessitate a trade-off between success in 
this attempt and success in obtaining any resulting interference pattern. Following 
Heisenberg(1930), one often considers shining light on the particles and collecting reflected light 
in a microscope focused on them as they pass the slits. In order to tell through which slit a 
particle goes one would need to use a microscope capable of resolving distances at least as small 
as the slit separation. Now the resolving power of a microscope is limited by the wavelength of 
light used: better resolving power requires light of shorter wavelength. However, photons of light 
of short enough wavelength would have such a large momentum as to disturb the particle and 
effectively to destroy the interference pattern. Even though no observation of the positions of C70 
molecules as they pass through the apparatus is contemplated in these experiments, and no light 
is shone on them, the theoretical model of decoherence shows that the possibility of photon 
emission of short enough wavelength to make it possible to determine through which slit each 
molecule goes is enough effectively to destroy the interference pattern. Moreover, the detailed 
form of the quantum state of the fullerene (expressed in the off-diagonal elements of the 
fullerene center-of-mass position density operator) describes the diffraction limitation of a 
hypothetical microscope used to obtain which-path information on the molecules. 
 The phrase “which-path information” (or „welcher-Weg-Information”) that occurs 
repeatedly in Hackermüller et al.(2004) and many other experimental as well as theoretical 
treatments of quantum interference is puzzling but highly suggestive. I shall pursue the 
suggestion after discussing another related experiment recently conducted in the same laboratory 
in Vienna. 
  Juffman et al.(2009) prepared a beam of C60 molecules with well-defined velocity, 
passed them through two gratings of a Talbot-Laue interferometer in a high vacuum, and 
collected them on a carefully prepared silicon surface placed at the Talbot distance. They then 
moved the silicon about a meter into a second high vacuum chamber and scanned the surface 
with a scanning tunneling electron microscope (STEM) capable of imaging individual atoms on 
the surface of the silicon. After running the microscope over a square area of approximately 
2μm2 they were able to produce an image of some one to two thousand C60 molecules forming an 
interference pattern.16 They reported that the surface binding of the fullerenes was so strong that 
they could not observe any clustering, even over two weeks. Clearly they felt no compunction in 
attributing very well defined, stable, positions to the molecules on the silicon surface, and even 
recommended developing this experiment into a technique for controlled deposition for nano-
technological applications. 
 Together, these experiments illustrate three different scenarios in which one may 
contemplate making a claim about the position of an individual fullerene molecule involved in a 
quantum interference experiment. By reflecting on the inferential commitments entered into by 
one who makes such a claim, we shall be able to gain a better appreciation of the significance of 
judgments expressed in NQMCs of the form S: ‘The value of A on s lies in Δ’, beginning with 
the case in which s is an individual fullerene molecule, A is the horizontal distance x (in 
nanometers) of its center of mass from a reference point in the plane of the vertically oriented 
gratings and Δ is an interval of real numbers. To repeat, while quantum theory itself does not 
                                                 
16 While initial scanning was performed at room temperature, cooling to low 
temperatures reduced thermal motion sufficiently to image the internal structure of individual 
molecules. 
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imply sentences of the form S, they play an essential role in any application of quantum theory. 
 After C60 molecule s has been deposited on the silicon substrate in the experiment of 
Juffman et al.(2009) and imaged by the STEM, their figures 2 and 3 (together with the 
surrounding discussion) illustrate that some claim of the form Sx: ‘The position x of s is xs±ε’ for 
some value of ε<5nm is warranted. The warrant derives substantially from the reliability of the 
image-forming process, importantly including the (quantum!) theory and practice underlying the 
successful operation of the STEM used to produce it. But there is a prior issue: given that a C60 
molecule may itself be treated as a quantum system, how and why is one entitled to attribute to s 
a definite, stable position in the first place? 
 It is in answering this question that it is appropriate to appeal to environmental 
decoherence. While it may be difficult to formulate and  solve the Schrödinger equation for a 
realistic many-body quantum interaction that binds s to the silicon surface, it is clear that this 
will rapidly and strongly couple s to an environment of an exponentially increasing number of 
degrees of freedom, involving the entire silicon crystal and light reflection from its surface, 
thermal radiation interacting with phonons in the crystal, vibrations and thermal motion of the 
supporting structure of the crystal, and eventually the entire laboratory and beyond. Examination 
of the properties of analytically and computationally solvable models of decoherence in simpler 
systems justifies one in concluding with a high degree of confidence that the center-of-mass state 
of s alone will extremely quickly become, and remain indefinitely in the absence of external 
disturbances, very close to diagonal in a preferred “position basis” of states, each close to a delta 
function of position. 
 It does not follow that some statement of the form Sx is true. On the present approach, no 
analysis of a decoherence interaction to show the (approximately) diagonal form of the quantum 
state of a decohering system ever itself thereby implies any such non-quantum statement. The 
import of the quantum analysis is more subtle. What decoherence shows in this example is that 
what an agent may legitimately infer from a claim about the position of s of the form Sx is, as it 
relates to any conceivable goal of that agent, exactly what would follow from the simple truth of 
Sx.17 This is how the quantum theory of decoherence licenses the experimenters in Juffman et 
al.(2009), anyone reading their paper, and indeed any suitably physically situated agent, human, 
conscious, or neither, to make some such claim. While quantum theory in this way licenses many 
incompatible claims of this form, each ascribing a different value xs1, xs2 , xs3 ,... to x, by itself the 
theory warrants an agent in claiming none of them: that requires additional, reliable empirical 
information of a kind acquired by the skillful use of the STEM used by Juffman et al.(2009) to 
produce data like that displayed in figures 2 and 3. Quantum licensing takes the following form: 
a quantum state of a system and its environment may be such as to grant an agent permission to 
issue a judgment of a certain kind concerning that system. Equipped with the necessary 
permission, the agent may be warranted by its “experience” to issue one rather than another 
judgment of that kind. 
 Feynman(1963, vol. III, 1.9) said this about the position of an electron as it passes 
through an analogous 2-hole interference experiment: 
if one has a piece of apparatus which is capable of determining whether the electrons go 
through hole 1 or hole 2, then one can say it goes through either hole 1 or hole 2. 
[otherwise] one may not say that an electron goes through either hole 1 or hole 2. If one 
                                                 
17 This claim will be further elaborated and defended in section 5. 
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does say that, and starts to make any deductions from the statement, he will make errors 
in the analysis. This is the logical tightrope on which we must walk if we wish to describe 
nature successfully. 
Consider instead the status of claims of the form Sx about a fullerene s as it passes through the 
interferometer gratings in either of the two experiments just described. In each diffraction grating 
in these experiments the slits were regularly spaced at a distance of some hundreds of 
nanometers. So if one could say Sor: Sxs1 or Sxs2 or Sxs3 or ... (where xsi marks the center of the ith 
slit and ε now corresponds to the width of each slit) then one could say the fullerene goes 
through slit 1 or slit 2 or slit 3 or ... . But can one say Sor? 
 In the experiment of Juffman et al.(2009) there was no piece of apparatus capable of 
determining which slit each fullerene goes through. What goes wrong if one says Sor? Feynman’s 
discussion makes clear the nature of the error he thinks would follow from this claim. Suppose 
one assumes the jth fullerene goes through slit i. It would have made no difference to its 
subsequent behavior if all the other slits had been closed, so it would have contributed to a single 
slit interference pattern centered on slit i. It follows that the total interference pattern will be just 
a sum of single slit patterns for all i, weighted by the number of fullerenes going through each 
slit. Since the actual interference pattern is quite different, Sor has been empirically falsified. 
 The form of the argument is reductio ad absurdum, but as is typical for such arguments it 
rests on additional premises, any of whose rejection prevents one from drawing the intended 
conclusion. Bohmians, among others, have principled reasons for denying that the behavior of a 
fullerene passing through one slit is independent of whether other slits are open or closed: 
roughly, they take its behavior to be governed by a physically real wave-function that passes 
through all the open slits. Bohmian mechanics shows how to draw many more interesting 
conclusions of Sor consistent with quantum-theoretic predictions, though at the cost of accepting 
action-at-a-distance.  
If one supplements Sor with no additional premises, one will never risk error in making 
deductions. This is a trivial consequence of two facts: (i) Sor is logically consistent, and (ii) no 
valid deductive argument can lead from logically consistent premises to a contradictory 
conclusion. But this response misses Feynman’s point, since he is clearly concerned not just with 
formally valid deductive arguments whose sole premise is Sor, but with inferences of the kind 
anyone with a normal understanding of Sor will naturally make, for example that: 
I. No particle passes through the material (silicon nitride) in which the slits are cut  
II. It is possible reliably to observe through which slit each particle passed without altering 
the interference pattern, or 
III. If this is not so, then that can only be because any physical mechanism that permitted 
reliable observation of through which slit each particle passed would inevitably disturb 
the particle while doing so 
 Brandom(2000), following Sellars(1953), calls inferences such as those from Sor to I, II, 
III material inferences. Here and in Brandom(1994) he develops what he calls an inferentialist 
pragmatism about conceptual content. It is a consequence of this kind of pragmatism that the 
content of Sor is a function of the material inferences that connect it to other claims and other 
actions by a claimant or others in the same linguistic community. Accepting quantum theory in 
no way undermines the inference from Sor to I: this remains a legitimate material inference even 
though it is not formally valid. But however natural inferences to II or III may seem, application 
of quantum theory shows that both II and III lead to conflict with results of experimental (or at 
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least Gedankenexperimental) findings.18 So while one can say Sor (pace Feynman), the content of 
that claim must be understood very differently within a community that has accepted a quantum 
theoretic analysis of the situation to which the claim applies. Given the possibility of confusion 
provided by so severely weakening the claim, it may be wise to heed Feynman’s cautionary 
advice not to say Sor at all in the context of the experiment of Juffman et al.(2009).  
 The status of Sor in the experiment of Hackermüller et al.(2004) is more complex. In the 
case of low temperature fullerenes, there is relatively little decoherence of their center of mass 
motion through the interferometer, so the analysis goes through as for the experiment of  Juffman 
et al.(2009). While one can say Sor, it is probably safest not to do so, since anyone who did so 
would naturally be understood as committed to inferences and other actions they did not intend. 
Without careful qualification, the weakened content of the claim would make it likely subject to 
misinterpretation. As the temperature of the fullerenes is increased, the interference contrast 
decreases. The authors comment 
 This is the signature of decoherence due to the enhanced probability for the 
 emission of thermal photons that carry ‘which-path’ information. ... They transmit 
(partial) which-path information to the environment, leading to a reduced observability of 
the fullerene wave nature. ... Around 3,000°K the molecules have a high probability to 
emit several visible photons yielding sufficient which-path information to effect a 
complete loss of fringe visibility in our interferometer. 
I believe it would misinterpret their use of the phrase ‘which-path information’ here to take them 
to presuppose that each fullerene follows a determinate, though unknown, path through the slits, 
which becomes progressively more open to potential observation as its temperature increases. It 
is better to regard the content of a claim made by a statement like Sor as itself a function of 
temperature, in the following sense: as the temperature is increased from 1000°K to 3000°K, the 
inferential power of the claim increases accordingly. This is why it becomes more and more 
appropriate to think and speak of the fullerenes as having a well-defined path through the 
interferometer as the degree of thermally induced electromagnetic decoherence into their 
environment increases. But note that on the present inferentialist view of content, this 
progressive definition of content has no natural limit such that one could say that when this limit 
is reached a statement like Sor is simply true because one has finally succeeded in establishing a 
kind of natural language-world correspondence relation in virtue of which the statement correctly 
represents some radically mind- and language-independent state of affairs. 
 It is important to bear this in mind when reconsidering the role of measurement in 
quantum theory. I have been careful not to formulate the Born rule narrowly so that it explicitly 
                                                 
18 Although it would be very difficult to modify the experiment of Juffman et al.(2009) to 
reliably observe through which slit each particle passed on its way to the silicon detector, claims 
of the form II and III have been experimentally refuted in analogous experiments with fewer 
“slits”. While observing through which slit each particle passed in such an experiment does 
require some interaction that correlates a particle’s state with that of a “probe” system, this need 
not disturb the particle’s state. So-called “quantum eraser” experiments demonstrate that even if 
an interference pattern is destroyed by an interaction that disturbs the particles’ states, it may be 
restored by a suitable interaction directly involving neither particle nor “probe” system. 
Moreover, for each particle, the restoring interaction can be delayed until after the particle is 
detected: see Walborn et al.(2002) for an actual two-slit delayed quantum erasure experiment. 
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concerns results of measurements on a quantum system. But it is vital that situations to which the 
Born rule applies include those in which scientists are warranted in making claims about the 
values of dynamical variables as a result of performing operations they take to constitute 
measurements of them. Recall from the introduction how Bell introduced his notion of beables to 
apply to things 
…which can be described in ‘classical terms’, because they are there. The beables must 
include the settings of switches and knobs on experimental equipment, the current in 
coils, and the readings of instruments. 
emphasizing that by ‘classical terms’ he 
refers simply to the familiar language of everyday affairs, including laboratory 
procedures, in which objective properties—beables—are assigned to objects. 
His thought seems to be that at least when it comes to descriptions of experimental equipment 
and laboratory procedures language must be taken to function in a straightforwardly 
representational way—as simply saying how things are. 
 What “is there” in these fullerene experiments? Because of the massive decoherence 
between large scale features of the macroscopic laboratory apparatus and its environment, 
quantum theory licenses claims about the settings of switches and knobs on experimental 
equipment, the macroscopic current in coils, and the readings of instruments. The content of such 
claims is almost, but not quite, unchanged by acceptance of quantum theory, since the limits the 
theory places on their inferential power are of no importance for any practical, or even 
impractical, purpose. Acceptance of quantum theory does significantly modify the content of 
claims about the microscopic currents produced by electrons tunneling from the fullerenes and 
silicon surface when scanned by the STEM in the experiment of Juffman et al.(2009). These 
currents cannot be said to “be there” in the same robust sense, in so far as each results from a 
tunneling process that is characteristically non-classical. And, as the preceding discussion made 
clear, acceptance of quantum theory so significantly limits the content of claims about the 
position of fullerenes as they pass through the interferometer that anyone making them at best 
courts confusion. But the efficiency of decohering interactions between a fullerene molecule and 
atoms of the silicon surface in the experiment of Juffman et al.(2009) is such that even though 
the molecule and atoms are microscopic and the interaction is quantum, a claim that the molecule 
is there at a specific location on the surface has almost the status of a claim that the entire 
apparatus is there in the laboratory. 
 There is no explicit reference to measurement in the published report of either fullerene 
experiment. Moreover, in applying quantum theory to account for the features of the interference 
patterns it is not necessary to interpret the Born rule explicitly to concern probabilities of 
measured positions of fullerenes in the pattern: one can take it simply to give probabilities for 
their positions at the detector. But I think it is clear that deposition of a C60 molecule on the 
silicon substrate in the experiment of Juffman et al.(2009) does count as performance of a 
quantum measurement of the molecule’s position. Certainly there is no temptation to say that the 
molecule has no definite position on the surface until and unless a subsequent observation is 
carried out using the STEM. 
 We can now see both why it is natural to formulate the Born rule so that it concerns 
probabilities of measurement outcomes and why the application of that rule is not restricted to 
measurement contexts. One reason to explicitly mention measurement in a formulation of the 
Born rule is to stress that the evidence justifying acceptance of quantum theory rests to a large 
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extent on the results of experiments in which observables are measured and the statistical 
distribution of measurement outcomes compared to those expected on the basis of the Born rule. 
If the Born rule could not be connected to measurement outcomes in this way, quantum theory 
would be cut off from its evidential base. But, as we have seen, the link can be preserved by 
simply assuming that the outcome of a quantum measurement can be expressed in a NQMC, 
with no mention of any measurement of a kind needed to determine the value of the magnitude 
in question. This leads to the second, more substantial reason for formulating the Born rule in 
terms of measurement: the no-go results mentioned in section 2. Not all dynamical variables on a 
quantum system can consistently be assigned simultaneous real values distributed in accordance 
with the Born probabilities—not even so as to match just the extremal Born probabilities 0 and 1. 
But this presents no problems on the present approach, since Born-rule probabilities are well-
defined only over claims licensed by quantum theory. According to the quantum theory, 
interaction of a system with its environment typically induces decoherence in such a way as 
(approximately) to select a preferred basis of states in the system’s Hilbert space. Quantum 
theory will fully license claims about the real value only of a dynamical variable represented by 
an operator that is diagonal in a preferred basis: it will grant a slightly less complete license to 
claims about approximately diagonal observables. All these dynamical variables can consistently 
be assigned simultaneous real values distributed in accordance with the Born probabilities. So 
there is no need to formulate the Born rule so that its probabilities concern only measurement 
outcomes. 
  
4. The relational nature of quantum states. There is a sense in which quantum states are 
relational on the present pragmatist approach. It is important to appreciate their relational 
character if one is to understand, among other things, the status of von Neumann’s “projection 
postulate” (wave-packet collapse), why violation of Bell-type inequalities poses no threat of non-
local action, why quantum probabilities are not simply Lewisian chances, and how to resolve the 
“paradox” of Wigner’s friend. But first it is necessary to say what this relational nature amounts 
to, and to distinguish it from other senses in which quantum states have been taken to be 
relational. 
 Rovelli(1996, 2005) proposed a relational view of quantum states. This maintains the 
tight connection between a quantum state and the values of dynamical variables in that state that 
has come to be known as the ‘eigenstate-eigenvalue link’: dynamical variable A has value a on s 
if and only if the quantum state of s is an eigenstate, with eigenvalue a, of the self-adjoint 
operator uniquely corresponding to A. Rovelli assumes that both quantum state and associated 
values of dynamical variables describe or represent the physical condition of an individual 
system s1, but only relative to some other physical system s2. This second system will in turn 
have a quantum state and associated values of dynamical variables relative to s1 (as well as to s3, 
s4,...): even though Rovelli sometimes calls it “the observer”, he stresses that s2 need be neither 
human, conscious, classically described, macroscopic, nor “special” in any way—it is just some 
other quantum system. On Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics, a quantum system has a 
quantum state and  associated values of dynamical variables only relative to (any) other distinct 
quantum system, and these relative states will in general differ according to which other system 
one relativizes them to. 
 Rovelli’s relational view of quantum states is quite different from the pragmatist view I 
am presenting, which begins by dismissing the eigenstate-eigenvalue link as not merely false but 
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arising from confusion between the radically different roles of quantum state ascriptions and 
claims about the values of dynamical variables in quantum theory. A second basic difference 
concerns what each view takes quantum states to be relative to. For the pragmatist, a quantum 
state ascription is not relative to an arbitrary distinct quantum system, but rather to the 
perspective of an actual or potential agent—some physically situated user of quantum theory. 
While every actual physically situated user of quantum theory may be treated as a quantum 
system (by some user of quantum theory), not every quantum system is a physically situated user 
of quantum theory. 
 Fuchs(2010) advocates what he calls a quantum Bayesian approach to quantum theory 
(QBism), and seeks to explore its connections to pragmatism, among other philosophies. QBism 
bears many similarities to the present pragmatist approach. QBism also rejects the eigenstate-
eigenvalue link as a misconceived attempt to understand quantum states as yielding descriptions 
of physical reality. A pragmatist will surely endorse Fuchs’s(2010) view that quantum theory as 
a whole is “a users’ manual that any agent can pick up and use to help make wise decisions in 
this world of inherent uncertainty”. Moreover, QBism agrees that quantum states are relative, to 
the extent that different agents can consistently assign different quantum states to the same 
system. But unlike the present pragmatist approach, QBism is committed to a subjective 
Bayesian view of probability that denies that quantum probabilities derived from the Born rule 
can ever be authoritative for a rational agent who accepts quantum theory. The key difference is 
that while, for the QBist, quantum state ascriptions depend on the epistemic state of the agent 
who ascribes them, on the present pragmatist approach what quantum state is to be ascribed to a 
system depends only on the physical circumstances defining the perspective of the agent (actual 
or merely hypothetical) that ascribes it. I will spell this out in more detail after pointing to a 
contrast with a third recent account of the relational nature of quantum states. 
 Bartlett et al.(2006, 2007) take a quantum state ascription to be relative to what they call 
a reference frame. In (2006) they motivate this as a way of resolving disputes that have arisen 
among physicists in a variety of contexts as to whether it is correct to assign to a system a 
quantum state that is a superposition or an incoherent mixture of eigenstates of some observable. 
The example they focus on is a dispute as to whether the quantum state of a laser operating 
above threshold is a coherent state (with a definite phase) or a mixture (that may be represented 
either as a uniform integral over projections onto coherent states of every phase, or alternatively 
as diagonal in a photon number basis). They offer to resolve this and analogous disputes by 
supposing that each state ascription may be considered equally correct, but relative to a different 
reference frame—in this case, relative to a different phase reference frame. They take a reference 
frame to be embodied in some physical object: in the example, some local oscillator could serve 
as a phase standard. The laser could be consistently ascribed a coherent state relative to a 
correlated (“implicated”) oscillator (such as the main beam in a homodyne detection experiment) 
and at the same time an incoherent state relative to an uncorrelated  (“non-implicated”) reference 
frame (like the beam from an independent laser). In their view 
...the whole debate presumes that quantum states only contain information about the 
intrinsic properties of a system. We submit that this presumption is mistaken; quantum 
states also contain information about the extrinsic properties of a system, that is, the 
relation of the system to other systems external to it, and whether or not coherences are 
applicable depends on the external system to which one is comparing. (2006, 28) 
A similar analysis would apply to any analogous dispute involving an observable (such as spin-
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component) which may itself be thought of as relational. 
 That quantum states are relational in this sense is interesting, especially because of the 
way it helps resolve disputes about quantum state ascription that may otherwise have been held 
up as counterexamples to section 2's claim that these are rare and short-lived. But while 
endorsing the resolution of these disputes offered by Bartlett et al.(2006, 2007), I take quantum 
states to be relational in a way distinct from relativity to reference frames in their sense. 
Specifically, quantum states are relational because any ascription of a quantum state to a system 
relates that system to a physically characterized situation that may (but need not) be occupied by 
a physically situated agent. A system’s quantum state is a state appropriate for any agent bearing 
the relevant kind of physical relation to that system, so the same system may be ascribed 
different states for different physical agent situations. Note that an agent situation need not 
actually be occupied by any agent, just as no observer need actually occupy an inertial reference 
frame, and recall that the term ‘agent’ is being used very broadly so as to apply to any physically 
instantiated user of quantum theory, whether human, merely conscious, or neither. 
 One important aspect of an agent situation is its temporal relation to the time for which a 
system’s quantum state is to be specified. It is by taking careful note of this relation that one can 
appreciate the significance of discontinuous changes in quantum states on measurement. 
 Consider the following example of a so-called negative result measurement. Suppose a 
source produces photons linearly polarized at 45° to the vertical: each such photon is heralded by 
detection, after passing through a 45° oriented polarizer, of a second photon of an entangled pair 
produced in parametric down conversion in a suitable nonlinear crystal.19 One such heralded 
photon is incident on a polarizing beam-splitter, in the vertical channel of which is located a 
high-efficiency photon detector. If nothing is detected, the photon is ascribed the horizontal 
polarization state |H›: the measurement has projected its superposed polarization state as follows 
1/√2 (  |H› + |V› ) →|H›                    (3) 
How can such projection be reconciled with the unitary evolution of the combined state of the 
photon and detector? 
 The answer to this question is that the quantum state of the photon’s polarization is a 
superposition of horizontal and vertical relative to the situation of an agent prior to the 
decohering interaction with the detector and its environment, but horizontal relative to the 
situation of an agent after that interaction. Decoherence involves no violation of unitarity. 
Instead, it warrants an agent in using the latter quantum state rather than the former to guide its 
expectations after judging that the detector has failed to detect the photon—a judgment that is 
licensed by the form of the unitarily evolved joint quantum state (which correlates the preferred 
“pointer basis” of detector states to horizontally/vertically polarized basis states of the photon) 
and warranted by its record of the detector’s failure to detect the photon. As Zurek(2009) 
explains, the post-interaction state of the detector and its environment acts as a “witness” of the 
horizontal polarization quantum state that may be consulted in many independent ways by an 
agent. Quantum theory cannot explain that such an agent records the detector’s failure rather 
than success—that remains outside its purview. But it can account for the “intrasubjective” 
                                                 
19 Assume, for now, that such a distant measurement on the entangled partner will 
produce this polarization state in the heralded photon. This assumption will be scrutinized 
shortly. 
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concordance of the agent’s records as it performs such multiple independent checks on the 
detector and the photon itself.20 
 A standard objection to the claim that decoherence can account for definite outcomes of 
quantum measurements may seem to apply also to this answer.21 Even if interactions rapidly and 
robustly entangle the joint state of photon and detector with the state of their environment so that 
their joint quantum state is a mixture of product states with no off-diagonal terms, this remains 
an improper mixture that cannot be understood to represent an agent’s state of ignorance as to 
their actual joint (pure) product state. There will be some complex collective dynamical variable 
on the combined photon, detector and environment system whose measurement will almost 
certainly display statistics distinguishable from those predicted by such a mixture of product 
states each correlated with a corresponding environment state. By repeatedly measuring the 
values of this dynamical variable on identically prepared photon+ detector+ initial environment 
systems, some “super-agent” could verify that their total state evolves unitarily in a way that is 
inconsistent with the assumption that the photon+detector system is in some (unknown) pure 
product state. 
 This objection cannot be turned into a good argument against the reconciliation of unitary 
evolution and effective “collapse” offered two paragraphs earlier: That reconciliation nowhere 
assumed that the quantum state of photon+detector was some (unknown) pure product state. 
Instead, it simply assumed unitary evolution of the total state, including the environment, to 
show that, conditional on recording the failure of the detector to detect a heralded photon, the 
Born probability for a recording of any measurement of the polarization of that photon (even 
including joint measurements with its environment) is exactly as predicted by assignment to it of 
quantum state |H›. This is why the photon’s quantum state is |H›, relative to the situation of an 
agent in a position to access records of the detector’s failure to fire. 
 So an agent with a record that the detector has not fired after the decohering interaction 
between photon and detector (together with its environment) is warranted in ascribing 
polarization state |H› to the photon. But the agent is not thereby warranted in inferring that this 
photon is horizontally polarized—an inference in conformity to the eigenstate-eigenvalue link. 
All the Born rule authorizes such an agent to do is to adopt a maximal degree of belief (1) that, 
following a second (ideal) interaction involving that photon that correlates its horizontal/vertical 
polarization state with the decohered state of some other polarization detector, the agent would 
record that detector as recording horizontal. At this point the distinction between quantum state 
and actual polarization may seem unmotivated. Its significance will become clear in section 5, 
which analyzes descriptions of a system by more than one agent. It is essential to maintain a 
distinction between relational quantum state ascriptions and non-relational dynamical variable 
ascriptions in order to ensure that applications of quantum theory carry objective import.  
 Consider an experiment set up to investigate violations of Bell inequalities in entangled 
photon pairs in which Bob measures polarization of photon R along axis b while Alice measures 
polarization of photon L along axis a. Suppose Alice, Bob and everyone else in their expert 
community is warranted in agreeing that the experiments are performed on photon pairs in the 
                                                 
20 I will address the important further issue of concordance among the records of more 
than one independent agent in section 5. 
21 See, for example, D’Espagnat(1990).  
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entangled polarization state 
|Φ+› =  1/√2 (  |HH› + |VV› )            (4) 
Suppose Bob’s measurement is concluded at a time tb before Alice performs her measurement. 
Bob then records his detector as indicating polarization of R along (rather than orthogonal to) the 
b axis, and ascribes polarization state |b› to photon L subsequent to tb. This ascription is 
warranted by considerations parallel to those that warranted ascribing polarization state |H› to 
the photon discussed in the immediately preceding paragraphs. Before she performs her 
measurement on L, no such considerations warrant Alice in ascribing state |b› to photon L. 
Instead, Alice is warranted in ascribing to L the same maximally-mixed polarization state given 
by tracing |Φ+› over the polarization Hilbert space of R as before Bob’s measurement. The 
quantum state of L relative to Alice’s agent situation is different from the quantum state of L 
relative to Bob’s agent situation. This is true whether or not there are any agents Alice and/or 
Bob actually occupying those situations: all that matters is that for a period of time after tb the R 
detector has suitably interacted with R and its environment but the L detector has not. 
 In an experiment like this, very little time will elapse between the R and L detection 
events. Indeed, in certain experiments the interval separating them is space-like rather than time-
like. These provide further illustrations of the relational nature of quantum state ascriptions. 
Suppose that Alice and Bob are moving so that while Bob represents the interaction of R with his 
detector to have concluded before the interaction of L with Alice’s detector, Alice takes these 
events to have occurred in the opposite time-order. Alice will then be warranted in ascribing 
quantum state |a›, say, to R subsequent (for her) to the time t′a she represents as the conclusion of 
her measurement of L. But if a≠b Bob will never be warranted in ascribing state |a› (or its 
Lorentz transform) to R, and nor will Alice ever be warranted in ascribing state |b› › (or its 
Lorentz transform) to L. Again, there need be no actual agents Alice and Bob moving in these 
ways. But note that specification of an agent situation here involves not only specification of a 
time interval, but also of a frame (inertial or otherwise) with respect to which that interval is 
defined.         
   We can now begin to see why quantum probabilities are not simply chances, as Lewis 
describes them. Section 5 will show how this also helps reconcile quantum theory’s violation of 
Bell inequalities with a physically motivated locality requirement. 
 Consider the following space-time diagram (in the laboratory frame), in which the 
diagonal lines mark boundaries of the causal past or future of the space-like separated events MA, 
MB at which L, R respectively interact appropriately with a polarization detector and its 
environment: 
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Suppose one asks: What is the probability at t1 that Alice’s detector will record L with 
polarization a? Since all agree that the quantum state of the pair at t1 is |Φ+›, the answer ½ 
follows uniquely by the Born rule. Assume for the moment that a=b, and consider this question: 
What is the probability at t2 that Alice’s detector will record L with polarization a? Applying the 
Born rule to her quantum state for L at t2, Alice will give the same answer as before, namely ½. 
Bob will apply the Born rule to his quantum state for L at t2 and give the different answer 1. If 
quantum probabilities obey Lewis’s Principal Principle that he takes to capture all we know 
about chance, then at least one of these answers must be wrong, since that principle presupposes 
that, while the chance of an event may change as time passes, it is uniquely defined at any given 
time. But just as quantum state ascriptions are relational, so also are Born probabilities. Relative 
to Alice’s agent situation the probability is ½, relative to Bob’s agent situation the probability is 
1. Neither probability is subjective, but both are correct. Each is authoritative for any agent that 
happens to be in the relevant agent situation, and accepting that this is so is a requirement on any 
agent that accepts quantum theory, whatever the actual situation of that agent. 
 Notice that adapting the framework of Lewisian chance to relativistic space-time 
structure by allowing the chance of an event to depend not on some absolute time but rather on 
the time in any reference frame will not effect a reconciliation between apparently conflicting 
quantum probabilities Alice and Bob should assign to the same event here. For Bob in his 
reference frame, there will be a time interval after MB and before MA during which he should 
assign probability 1 to Alice’s recording polarization a on photon L. But this probability 
assignment could play no role in the decision-making of any agent at rest in Bob’s reference 
MB
MA
Alice-at-t3
Alice-at-t2
Bob-at-t2
Bob-at-t1
X
X X
X
t
Space-time diagram for non-local correlations
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frame but within the back light-cone of MA, since the outcome of Bob’s measurement lies outside 
her back light-cone and should be counted by Lewis as inadmissible information for her 
(assuming no superluminal signaling): the objective probability for her remains ½, as specified 
by the Born rule applied to her quantum state. The relativization of chance to an arbitrary 
foliation by space-like Cauchy surfaces would face essentially the same objection: the value of 
the chance at some point on a Cauchy surface would be irrelevant to the decision-making of an 
agent at that point. One could try to understand quantum probabilities as Lewisian chances of an 
event by specifying them only on space-like hypersurfaces restricted to the causal past of that 
event—the closure of the event’s back light-cone. But this proves problematic for a different 
reason. To take the value of the chance of an outcome of MA on a space-like hypersurface within 
the back light-cone of MA to be given by Alice’s Born probabilities is to ignore the relevant 
information provided by the record of Bob’s measurement that is available to Bob at t2: On the 
other hand taking the value of this chance to be given by Bob’s Born probabilities both makes it 
arbitrary on which space-like hypersurface within MA’s causal past they change and raises the 
specter of non-local action. 
 The relational nature of quantum state ascriptions and the consequence that Born 
probabilities are not simply time-relativized Lewisian chances may be brought home even more 
forcefully by examining an experiment first proposed by Peres(2000): a version of the 
experiment has recently been successfully performed. Since the experiment combines two 
independently interesting quantum phenomena, I begin by discussing the first—entanglement 
swapping—before introducing the second—delayed choice. 
  Two agents, Alice and Bob, simultaneously but independently prepare pairs of 
polarization-entangled photons in (universally agreed) quantum state |Ψ−› = 1/√2 ( |HV› −  |VH›):  
call Alice’s photons 1,2 and Bob’s 3,4. Alice measures the polarization of photon 1 along axis a, 
while Bob measures the polarization of photon 4 along axis b. Photons 2 and 3 are passed 
through optical fiber delays before each is incident on a beam splitter as indicated in the 
accompanying space-time sketch. A third agent, Victor, then measures the polarization along 
axis H of any photons emerging to the left of the beam splitter, and the polarization along axis H 
of any photons emerging to the right of the beam splitter. After allowing for the delay, careful 
timing permits recording of fourfold coincidence counts from detection of all four photons from 
two pairs simultaneously prepared by Alice and Bob. 
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Ent angl ement Swappi ng
 
 
 Consider any such four-fold detection. The initial quantum state has the form of a product 
of two EPR states |Ψ−›12|Ψ−›34. This may be expanded in terms of the four Bell states 
 
 |Ψ−› = 1/√2 (  |HV› −  |VH› ) 
|Ψ+› = 1/√2 (  |HV› +  |VH› ) 
|Φ−› = 1/√2 (  |HH› −  |VV› ) 
|Φ+› = 1/√2 (  |HH› +  |VV› ) 
as follows 
 
|Ψ−›12|Ψ−›34 = 1/2(|Ψ+›14|Ψ+›23 − |Ψ−›14|Ψ−›23 − |Φ+›14|Φ+›23 + |Φ−›14|Φ−›23)  (5) 
           
Analysis of the actual experimental setup shows that cases (i) in which Victor records one 
photon as detected to each side of the beam splitter (with the same polarization) have non-zero 
Born probability only from the fourth term in (5), while cases (ii) in which Victor records both 
photons as detected to the same side of the beam splitter (with opposite polarizations) have non-
zero Born probability only from the third term in (5). 
 What polarization quantum state should Victor ascribe to a pair 1+4? In a case (i) he 
should ascribe the corresponding 1+4 pair the quantum state |Φ−›14, while in a case (ii) he should 
ascribe the corresponding pair 1+4 the state |Φ+›14. In either case, Victor should ascribe an 
entangled state to systems that have never interacted, directly or indirectly. Moreover, in either 
case Victor ascribes a quantum state to a pair of systems after each system has been detected and 
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no longer has any independent existence. The function of such quantum state ascriptions is 
perfectly standard. By inserting the relevant quantum state into the Born rule, any agent in 
Victor’s situation can adjust its expectations concerning matters of which it is currently ignorant, 
namely what is recorded by Alice and Bob’s detectors. Such expectations can be (and in the 
actual experiment were) compared to Alice and Bob’s records in many cases of type (i) and 
many cases of type (ii). Those records returned statistics in conformity to the Born rule and in 
violation of Bell inequalities (as the polarization axes a, b were suitably varied). What this 
experiment illustrates in a striking way is that an agent may need to form expectations 
concerning events that have already happened although his physical situation renders him 
inevitably ignorant of their outcomes. Until physical interactions have suitably correlated 
Victor’s records with the records of Alice and Bob’s detectors and their environment, the 
objective Born probabilities he derives from the quantum state for his agent situation remain his 
most reliable guide to belief about their records. 
 There is a further feature of this experiment that involves delayed choice. Clearly, if the 
beam splitter were not present there would be no swapping of entanglement: 1+2 would remain 
entangled, as would 3+4, but there would be no entanglement across these pairs. The experiment 
is therefore designed to allow a “decision”, effectively as to whether or not to introduce the beam 
splitter, to be postponed until after photons 1 and 4 have been detected. (In the actual 
experiment, implementing the “decision” was a little more complex, and was carried out by a 
quantum random number generator rather than any agent, human or otherwise.) With this 
additional feature, whether an agent in Victor’s situation ascribes an entangled or a separable 
state to photons 1 and 4 depends on events that occur after these photons have been detected. The 
delayed-choice entanglement-swapping experiment reinforces the lesson that quantum states are 
neither descriptions nor representations of physical reality. In particular, it undermines the idea 
that ascribing an entangled state to quantum systems is a way of representing some new, non-
classical, physical relation between them. To hold onto that idea in the context of this experiment 
would require one to maintain not only that which entanglement relation obtains between a pair 
of photons at some time, but also whether any such relation then obtains between them, depends 
on what happens to other independent systems later, after the pair has been absorbed into the 
environment. 
 Note also that the Born probabilities flowing from these assignments of quantum states 
cannot here be understood as chances that conform to Lewis’s Principal Principle. That principle 
is supposed to explicate the role of chance in decision-making at a time by saying how an agent 
should base his credence of an event on the event’s chance at that time. We saw earlier that to be 
guided by quantum theory in his decision-making, an agent may need to take account of 
information to which he is privy but that must remain inaccessible to other agents at that time. 
We now see a situation in which quantum theory supplies objective probabilities concerning a 
pair of events to no agent until after those events have occurred. Clearly these probabilities 
cannot guide any agent in forming credences about these events ahead of time. But they can still 
be useful to a decision-maker like Victor who is kept in ignorance of Alice and Bob’s results. 
 Such ignorance would be irremediable in a modified scenario where the choice and 
Victor’s  measurements are space-like separated from Alice’s and Bob’s measurements 
(assuming no-superluminal signaling). In Lewis’s terminology, that scenario would render 
information about Alice’s and Bob’s results inadmissible for Victor for a while after they had 
already occurred in his reference frame. Even thought they are objective, Born probabilities are 
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indexed not to a time, but to the physical situation of a potential agent relative to the events they 
concern. These probabilities sometimes, but not always, depend on the temporal aspect of this 
relation. But whether or not they do, they may depend also on further physical aspects. 
   
5. The objectivity of physical description in quantum theory. If quantum state ascriptions and 
the consequent Born probabilities are relative to agent situations, then is there any non-relational 
physical description on which agents in all situations can agree?  The analogous question in the 
context of relativity theory receives a straightforward answer: frame-dependent descriptions 
including those of length and time-intervals may be thought to derive from frame-independent 
invariants such as the space-time interval. The question must be answered positively in the 
context of quantum theory in order to facilitate descriptive claims about the physical world any 
agent can endorse whatever that agent’s physical situation, so that these claims can contribute to 
the predictive and explanatory goals of physics. 
 Section 3 explained why no claim expressed by a sentence of the form S: “The value of A 
on s lies in Δ”  (no NQMC) is implied by any quantum state ascription (QSA) or Born 
probability statement (BPS)—even in a case in which S is correctly assigned Born probability 1 
(relative to some agent situation). NQMCs were frequently and correctly made before the 
development of quantum theory and continue to be made after its widespread acceptance, which 
is why I call them non-quantum. While quantum theory adds no new ways of describing the 
physical world, it does offer authoritative advice to a situated agent, both on the content of 
NQMCs relevant to its situation, and on the degree of belief appropriate to such claims. The 
appropriate degree of belief generally depends on the agent situation, so differently situated 
agents are frequently advised to hold different epistemic attitudes toward NQMCs. But the 
content of a NQMC about a system s does not depend on agent situation. That is why any 
NQMC can be taken to offer a physical description that is objective, in the sense that the content 
of the claim is strongly agent-independent: it is independent of the physical as well as the 
epistemic state of any agent (human, conscious, or neither) that may make or evaluate it. But 
acceptance of quantum theory so drastically limits the content of some NQMCs that they can no 
longer contribute to the explanatory or predictive goals of physics and so are best left unsaid. 
 The distinctions just drawn between quantum state ascriptions, Born probability 
statements and non-quantum magnitude claims are important in explaining why quantum 
violation of Bell inequalities involves no physically problematic non-locality. Recall the 
discussion of non-local correlations in section 4. Remember that the event MB when Bob 
measures the polarization of photon R along the b-axis occurs earlier in the laboratory frame than 
the event MA when Alice measures the polarization of photon L along the a-axis. How should the 
relevant systems be described by NQMCs? Consider the following claims: 
D1: Photon-detector L records polarization a or polarization a٣. 
D2: Photon-detector L records polarization a. 
P1: Photon L has polarization b or polarization b٣. 
P2: Photon L has polarization b. 
Assume (all experts including Alice and Bob agree that) a photon pair is emitted in polarization 
state |Φ+〉 and detection is perfectly efficient. D1 can be taken to express an NQMC that is 
licensed by quantum theory (because of the decohering polarization-correlation interaction 
between L and its detector+environment) and warranted for any agent at any time, simply 
because Alice’s photon detector is in good working order. D2 can similarly be taken to express 
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an NQMC that is licensed by quantum theory, but whereas D2 is warranted for Alice as soon as 
she records the L polarization, Bob is justified in making claim D2 only when Alice 
communicates to him the record of the L polarization later---unless b=a, in which case Bob will 
be justified in claiming D2 as soon as his detector records polarization a on photon R. (If b≠a 
then D2 will be at most partially warranted for Bob before receipt of Alice’s message.) 
 Now consider claims P1 and P2. One might suppose that Bob is justified in claim P2 after 
consulting his photon detector R and finding that it has recorded polarization b, and that his 
entitlement extends to claim P1 by simple logic. But this is incorrect. Even if MB occurs 
invariantly earlier than MA , quantum theory grants an agent (like Bob) only an extremely limited 
license to claims P1 and P2: the content of these claims is severely weakened by the severe 
restrictions on what material inferences they support. This is because in the interval between MB 
and MA photon L undergoes no interaction with its environment capable of delocalizing its 
quantum polarization state in a preferred b-b٣ basis. After his detector records polarization b for 
R, Bob’s situation does warrant him in ascribing polarization state |b〉 to photon L: this becomes 
his new quantum polarization state for that photon. But no QSA implies any NQMC: the 
eigenstate-eigenvalue link fails. P2 does support some material inferences to behavior 
characteristic of classically polarized light, importantly including that photon-detector L would 
record polarization b, and indeed will do so if b=a. But Bob is already warranted in believing 
these conclusions by his assignment of quantum state |b〉 to photon L, and so is any agent 
(including Alice) who knows the result of Bob’s measurement. Any agent can reach these 
conclusions by assigning |Φ+〉 to the photon pair and conditionalizing on Bob’s recorded R 
polarization b. So this part of the content of claim P2 can be secured without it. Moreover, P2 
will not support additional material inferences just because L undergoes no decoherence 
interaction robustly correlating its b-polarization state to an environment. These considerations 
also undercut claim P1. So Bob has no warrant for claiming P2 if the content of this claim is 
taken to extend beyond that of the claim that his quantum polarization state for L is |b〉, and no 
warrant for claiming P1 if the content of that claim is taken to extend beyond that of the claim 
that his quantum polarization state for L is either |b〉 or |b٣〉. These claims have no place in a 
careful agent-independent physical description capable of explaining the non-local correlations. 
Nor do analogous claims about the polarization of R. 
 Notice that we have now provided a reason why quantum theoretical analysis of these 
non-local correlations does not involve attributing to the polarizations of the L, R photons in a 
pair 
 “…any mutually independent existence (state of reality) [when] viewed separately, not even if 
[they] are spatially separated from one another at the particular time under consideration.”22 
At most, quantum theory licenses a claim about the polarization prior to detection of the L-
photon only with respect to the b-axis, and a claim about the polarization prior to detection of the 
R-photon only with respect to the a-axis: and the license it extends to these claims is so severely 
restricted that neither amounts to a report on an independently existing state of reality. This is 
fortunate, since a well-trodden path takes one from the independent existence of pre-existing 
polarization states of both photons along every axis that their respective detectors simply reveal 
to Bell inequalities, whose experimentally-confirmed violation confirms quantum theoretical 
predictions derived from the Born rule as applied to state |Φ+〉. If each arbitrarily-oriented 
                                                 
22 Einstein (1949, 681-2) 
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photon-detector faithfully revealed a pre-existing polarization of the detected photon, and these 
polarizations were distributed among many pairs in state |Φ+〉 in a way that was independent of 
the detector settings a, b, then the only way to restore consistency with the Born rule predictions 
would be to allow that the polarization state of a photon could be non-locally altered before 
reaching the detector. That would constitute a blatant violation of a physical locality condition 
Einstein(1948, 322) stated as follows 
aussere Beeinflussung von A hat keinen unmittelbaren Einfluss auf B; dies ist als << 
Prinzip der Nahewirkung >> bekannt  (“an external influence on A has no immediate 
effect on B; this is known as the ‘principle of local action’ ”) 
The present pragmatist approach to quantum theory acquits it of any such violation of local 
action. 
 Bell inequalities may be derived in a bipartite system like the photon pair LR without 
assuming anything corresponding to independently existing polarizations for each subsystem. 
The key assumptions here are of conditional probabilistic independence such as the following 
(Gisin, 2009) where I suppose that α, β are variables ranging over the possible values of 
polarization recorded by L, R detectors respectively along the a, b axes, and λ (which may 
include the quantum state, here |Φ+〉) specifies the situation of everything in the past irrelevant to 
the choice of a, b axes: 
prob(α|a, b, λ) = prob(α|a, λ) :  prob(β|a, b, α, λ) = prob(β|b, λ)  (6) 
Which together imply 
prob(α, β|a, b, λ) = prob(α|a, λ) × prob(β|b, λ)                             (7) 
Gisin glosses these conditions as follows 
...for any give “state of affairs” λ, what happens on Alice’s side does not depend on what 
happens on Bob’s side, and vice versa. 
But if λ is just whatever earlier physical conditions warrant ascription of quantum state |Φ+〉 to 
the pair, and the probabilities appearing in (6) are taken to be consequences of the Born rule as 
applied to |Φ+〉, then neither (6) nor (7) says anything about what happens in this situation. As in 
the BPSs from which they follow, (6) and (7) describe nothing in the physical world: their role is 
simply to offer authoritative advice to an agent such as Alice or Bob on what to expect in the 
situation described. As section 2 explained, a Born probability statement does not purport to 
describe physical reality. Its role within the theory is to offer objective advice to a physically 
situated agent on how to apportion beliefs concerning matters of which it is ignorant. So 
understood, conditions like (6) and (7) do not express physical locality conditions. The fact that 
Born probabilities violate the second part of (6) does not make the quantum world physically 
non-local. But it is interesting to note that if Born probabilities had violated just the first part of 
(6), by choosing one axis of his detector rather than another during repeated runs of the 
experiment, Bob would have been able to guide Alice’s expectations and thereby manipulate her 
behavior in a way that would have violated Einstein’s principle of local action! So the no-
signaling theorems remain critical to this acquittal of quantum theory from the charge of 
violating a physically motivated locality condition. 
 The content of a NQMC expressed by D1 or D2 is in no way relative to the situation of 
any actual or possible agent, even though an agent’s situation may well affect its warrant for 
making that claim. Moreover, because of the nature of the decohering polarization-correlation 
interaction between L and its detector+environment, the inferential power of one of these claims 
extends very far—far enough for such claims to be considered simply objective descriptions of 
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the physical world for all practical and impractical purposes of any agent. An agent making such 
a claim may therefore be understood to be offering an objective description of the physical event 
normally taken to constitute the outcome of a measurement of linear polarization of L along the a 
axis. It is by licensing, though not implying, such claims that quantum theory authorizes 
objective physical description of the world. 
 As we have seen, the status of NQMCs P1 and P2 is different. Even though their content 
need not be regarded as relative to the situation of any agent making them, quantum theory 
severely limits their inferential power. This so restricts their content that it is no longer 
appropriate to think of these claims as simply offering an objective description of the physical 
properties of photon L, or of any other physical state of affairs. This does not mean that such 
claims have no use. Bob may utter P2 intending thereby merely to ascribe quantum state |b〉 to 
photon L, and such a usage may acquire common currency within a community of quantum 
physicists. Indeed, physicists do often ascribe linear polarization states to photons. But this does 
not show that by saying something like P2 these physicists are offering objective physical 
descriptions. By familiarizing themselves with quantum theory they have internalized the limited 
inferential power attached to such a claim and they use it with that common understanding. 
 The “paradox” of Wigner’s friend presents a challenge to the objectivity of physical 
description within quantum theory. To set up the “paradox”, imagine Schrödinger’s cat (and 
associated “diabolical device”) replaced by a human experimenter (Wigner’s friend) who records 
in a device D the result of a quantum measurement he has performed on a system s inside his 
isolated laboratory.23 For example, suppose that s is the photon L just considered, DL detects its 
polarization along the a axis, and the friend is Bob. Meanwhile, another agent W remains outside 
the laboratory. After consulting the record of DR, Bob ascribes quantum polarization state |b〉 to L 
and applies the Born rule to calculate the probability, (|‹a|b〉|2), of D2. He performs the 
measurement, consults DL, and records the outcome by writing D2 in his notebook. W, on the 
other hand, ascribes a quantum state |ΨW〉 to the enormously complex system composed of L, R, 
Bob, DL, DR, the notebook and everything else in the laboratory, and uses this to calculate the 
Born probability of D2. Even though this will not equal (|‹a|b〉|2), no inconsistency arises, since 
all BPSs are relative to the physical situation of an agent making them, and W and Bob are in 
relevantly different physical situations: at this stage Bob has interacted, first with DR, and then 
with DL, but W has interacted with neither. 
 An inconsistency would arise if one took a quantum state completely to describe a system 
in accordance with the eigenstate-eigenvalue link and assumed measurement collapses this state 
onto an eigenstate corresponding to the corresponding eigenvalue of the measured observable. 
Bob would then take his measurement of L-photon polarization to collapse the state of L-
photon+DL onto an eigenstate of which a “pointer reading” on DL was an eigenvalue. But, 
treating Bob merely as part of the physical contents of the laboratory, W would deny that the 
state |ΨW〉 collapsed onto such an eigenstate until he, W, made a measurement by entering the 
                                                 
23 To call the laboratory ‘isolated’, is to require by fiat the absence of any decohering 
interactions with its external environment. So we are talking of a ridiculously impractical 
Gedankenexperiment, as Schrödinger explicitly said he was when describing his cat scenario. 
The point of doing so is to explain why even such an extremely hypothetical situation would 
pose no threat to the objectivity of physical description in quantum theory. 
  
29
laboratory to see what polarization DL had recorded. There is no threat of such inconsistent 
descriptions of the contents of the laboratory prior to W’s entry on the present pragmatist 
approach, which denies any descriptive role to quantum states. But if quantum theory denies W 
the license to use his quantum state |ΨW〉 to describe what is happening in the laboratory before 
he enters, while licensing Bob to make descriptive claims such as D2, then how can a claim 
like D2  be taken to offer an objective physical description ? 
 A default assumption underlying the objectivity of physical description dictates that W 
accept Bob’s sincere report D2 when backed up by W’s own independent investigations. This 
assumption is so deeply embedded in scientific methodology that it is hard to imagine how any 
kind of scientific activity could survive its wholesale rejection. W’s quantum analysis of his 
situation may seem to challenge this assumption. Since he knows that Bob was to prepare his 
photon pair in polarization state |Φ+›, W’s initial quantum state |ΨW〉t1 will include a 
representation of the polarization state of the L-photon that is a superposition of |a〉 and |a٣〉 with 
appropriate non-zero coefficients. Subsequent interactions with DL, further recording equipment, 
Bob and Bob’s notebook will entangle this superposition with their quantum states. Nothing 
about this quantum state will even suggest what result (if any) Bob got in his measurement of the 
polarization of the L-photon.  But W’s quantum state will advise him to expect that, whatever 
that result may be, the laboratory will contain multiple mutually supporting records of it. So that 
while his quantum analysis alone provides W no warrant for believing D2, it does warrant W in 
believing that his observation of DL, consultation with Bob, reading Bob’s notebook, and any 
other examination of what is ordinarily taken to be evidence that D2 was true even before he 
entered the laboratory, will all be mutually consistent with each other, and consistent also—
either with D2 or else with D2٣: Photon-detector DL records polarization a٣. It remains perfectly 
consistent with W’s quantum analysis of the situation for him to suppose that it is D2٣, not D2, 
that correctly described the physical situation prior to his entering the laboratory, despite Bob’s 
sincere statement that he remembers recording D2 , backed up by all W’s own observations on 
entering the laboratory. 
 There is nothing strictly paradoxical about this situation. But it does prompt the skeptical 
concern that an agent who accepts quantum theory no longer has any reason to expect apparently 
sincere reports of fellow agents concerning readily observable properties of macroscopic objects 
to be reliable, not even if these are backed up by its own independent observations of these 
properties, together with what are ordinarily considered traces of them. Quantum theory does not 
validate the default assumption underlying the objectivity of physical description. 
 I think the right way for a scientist to respond to this concern is simply to refuse to take 
this skeptical possibility seriously. A scientist begins by trusting his or her own observations as 
well as those of others and questions these only when further observations provide positive 
reasons for doing so. Nothing we learn from quantum theory or anything else in science provides 
W with any reason for questioning his own or his friend’s sincere observation reports concerning 
the outcomes of quantum measurements or the gross properties of macroscopic objects. Science 
concerns itself precisely with those physical descriptions that can be taken to be objective in the 
sense that they are open to support from multiple independent observations whose evidential 
import can be collectively undercut only by this kind of radical philosophical skepticism, 
yielding to which would render scientific investigation of any kind impossible. The extremely 
hypothetical scenario of Wigner’s friend fails to lift the burden of proof from one who would 
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seek to deny the objectivity of physical descriptions such as that offered by the claim D2. 
 A further twist on the Wigner’s friend scenario will help to bring out a quantum 
limitation on the content of all NQMCs (including not only D2 but also claims such as Sx from 
section 3), and indeed on all physical descriptions. Consider W’s quantum state |ΨW〉. Since the 
entire laboratory and its contents constitutes an isolated system, W will take |ΨW〉 to have evolved 
unitarily from its state |ΨW〉t1 prior to his friend’s measurement of the polarization of L to its state 
|ΨW〉t2 just as he enters the laboratory to ask his friend about its result. 
 |ΨW〉t2  = U12 |ΨW〉t1            (8) 
W should ascribe to the contents of the laboratory at t1 a quantum state that reflects his belief that 
his friend has not yet performed the planned measurement on L. So W will be warranted in 
ascribing to these contents a state |ΨW〉t1 that assigns Born probability 1 to NQMCs on DL, Bob 
and his notebook that suffices to substantiate that belief. Mathematically, there will exist a 
Hamiltonian that would induce the time-reversed evolution of |ΨW〉 so that at a later time t3 
(where t3 − t2 =  t2 − t1) it is restored to its value before the friend measured the polarization of L 
 |ΨW〉t3  = U†23 |ΨW〉t2  =  |ΨW〉t1     (9) 
If W had the powers of a quantum demon, he could instantaneously replace the original 
Hamiltonian by this time-reversing Hamiltonian at t2, thereby restoring  |ΨW〉 at t3 to its original 
value at t1.24 Suppose that he does so, and postpones his entry into the laboratory until t3. Since 
the quantum state of the entire laboratory is identical to what it was before his friend had made 
any measurement of the polarization of L, W must fully expect that if he then asks his friend 
about the result of his measurement, the friend will say he has not yet performed any 
measurement. He must further fully expect that his own examination at, and at any time after, t3 
of DL, Bob’s notebook, and anything else inside the laboratory will reveal no record of any such 
measurement ever having been made. W’s action at t2 has, by t3, erased all traces of Bob’s 
measurement of the polarization of L and its result: Indeed, W has succeeded in erasing all traces 
of everything that happened inside the laboratory between t1 and t3.   
 It is deeply embedded in the way we ordinarily think about the past that everything that 
happens leaves some trace of its occurrence, however epistemically inaccessible this may be to 
us. Dummett(1969) even took rejection of this assumption to be a significant motive for 
antirealism about the past---the view that statements about the past on which no present or future 
evidence bears have no determinate truth-value. Consideration of the extended Wigner’s friend 
scenario shows that one who wholly accepts quantum theory must limit the content of NQMCs 
and indeed all other physical descriptions so that such a claim does not thereby exclude the 
physical possibility that the claimed state of affairs leave no trace whatever. But while allowing 
for this possibility does marginally weaken every physical description I do not see that quantum 
theory thereby makes physical description any the less objective. 
                                                 
24 While completely out of the question for such a complex system, such reversals have 
been seriously considered as a way to restore coherence in a mesoscopic system consisting of an 
electron on a quantum dot interacting with about a million nuclear spins (see Yao et al.(2007)). 
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6. Conclusion. I promised a diagnosis of the curious situation that while there are no serious and 
lasting disagreements among physicists on the use of quantum theory, disputes about its meaning 
began with its inception and continue unchecked. I suggest that what is largely responsible for 
this situation is the assumption (tacit or explicit) that the meaning of quantum theory must be 
given by saying what the physical world is like, according to that theory. That the meaning of 
any theory is to be given by spelling out its truth-conditions is an assumption no pragmatist will 
leave uncontested. Rejecting this blinkered perspective on interpretation makes it possible to see 
that the real significance of quantum theory for the philosophy of science is how it advances the 
goals of physics without presenting us with novel ways of representing the world. In this paper I 
have indicated how this new perspective permits progress on long-standing problems such as the 
measurement problem and quantum non-locality: many details remain to be filled in 
subsequently. 
 One goal of physics emphasized by realists is explanation of natural phenomena. I 
anticipate the objection that quantum theory is only able to achieve its great explanatory success 
through is deployment of novel theoretical representations of the world. Since this pragmatist 
interpretation cannot account for quantum theory’s explanatory successes (the objection 
continues), it is merely a new name for a bad old way of thinking–instrumentalism! To confine 
the present paper within reasonable bounds, a second paper will be devoted to a detailed 
refutation of this objection. 
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